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Abstract
We develop an equilibrium model of on-the-job search with ex-ante heteroge-
neous workers and firms, aggregate uncertainty and vacancy creation. The
model produces rich dynamics in which the distributions of unemployed work-
ers, vacancies and worker-firm matches evolve stochastically over time. We
prove that the surplus function, which fully characterizes the match value and
the mobility decision of workers, does not depend on these distributions. This
result means the model is tractable and can be estimated. We illustrate the
quantitative implications of the model by fitting to US aggregate labor market
data from 1951-2012. The model has rich implications for the cyclical dynam-
ics of the distribution of skills of the unemployed, the distribution of types of
vacancies posted, and sorting between heterogeneous workers and firms.
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1 Introduction
There are many questions about the functioning of labor markets that concern the
extent to which heterogeneous workers and firms are differentially affected by aggre-
gate shocks. How does the distribution of skills among the unemployed vary with
the business cycle? How does the quality of matches for workers transiting from
unemployment vary with the aggregate state? Similarly, how is the reallocation of
currently employed workers to more appropriate matches related to the business cy-
cle? To answer these questions and understand the interactions requires a model of
the labor market which incorporates both worker and firm level heterogeneity and
aggregate uncertainty. Existing equilibrium search models of the labor market with
heterogeneous workers and firms, such as Burdett and Mortensen (1998) and Postel-
Vinay and Robin (2002) are steady-state models. They rely heavily on stationarity
for tractability, which means the equilibrium distributions can effectively be treated
as parameters rather than state variables.
In this paper, we develop a stochastic model of random search on the job, with
ex-ante heterogeneous workers and firms and aggregate productivity shocks in which
firms make state contingent offers and counter offers to workers. The model ex-
tends the work of Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002), incorporating aggregate productiv-
ity shocks and non-stationary distributions of unemployed workers and worker-firm
matches, and Robin (2011), introducing firm heterogeneity, vacancy creation, and
a meeting function à la Pissarides (1985). We obtain tractability by working with
the function that defines the joint surplus of a worker-firm match, rather than the
individual value functions of the worker and firm separately. The model delivers rich
dynamics in which the distributions of unemployed workers, posted vacancies, and
worker-firm matches evolve stochastically over time. We prove that the surplus func-
tion, which defines the value of a match and fully characterizes the mobility decision
of workers, does not depend either on the current wage, or on the current distributions
of unemployed workers, posted vacancies or worker-firm matches. The implication is
that the fixed point defining the surplus can be solved for independently from the
current distributions of vacancies, unemployed workers, and worker-firm matches.
The evolution of these distributions in the stochastic economy can then be solved
for exactly, given the initial conditions. In addition, decisions about matching and
separations are entirely independent of the current wage contract (but not of the rules
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governing rent sharing).
Our work is related to several recent developments in directed search and wage
posting models. In the directed-search, wage-posting model of Shi (2009), Menzio
and Shi (2010a; 2010b; 2011), and Rudanko (2011), the equilibrium is also block-
recursive, i.e. such that agents’ value and policy functions are independent of the
endogenous distribution of workers across employment states.1 We have a closely re-
lated result. The advantages of our model with respect to the directed search model
are that two-sided worker-firm heterogeneity is easily introduced; search frictions gen-
erate imperfect sorting (mismatch) at the equilibrium; workers search on the job and
employers counter outside offers; and decisions about wages and matching are natu-
rally separated. Dynamic versions of Burdett and Mortensen’s (1998) wage posting
model have been proposed by Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2010; 2013) and Coles and
Mortensen (2012).2 Wage posting models with large firms, with random or directed
search, allow one to analyze firm size growth from entry to steady-state equilibrium,
as well as the response of firm size to aggregate shocks. They also link firm size to
posted wages. They do not extend well to describing how different workers match
with different firms, and the interaction between worker and firm heterogeneity and
aggregate shocks.
Unlike wage posting models, our model does not have a natural definition of firm
size because we adopt the common approach of one-worker-one-firm matches. Yet, it
does produce an equilibrium distribution of workers by firm type that moves along
with the business cycle. Given that all the afore-mentioned wage posting models
assume constant returns to scale with respect to firm size and rule out within-firm
worker externalities, it is not clear that grouping matches by firm type and calling
this firm size would produce very different predictions. In addition, because search
is not directed, our model naturally produces imperfect matching in equilibrium (i.e.
workers are willing to accept a range of job types and firms are willing to hire a range of
worker types). For this reason business cycle fluctuations of mismatch will be our main
empirical application. As far as we are aware this is the first empirical application
1Kaas and Kircher (2015) extends Menzio and Shi’s model to allow for firm size. Schaal (2012)
presents an application of Menzio and Shi’s directed search model with firm size, shocks to the first
and second order moments of aggregate productivity, and with idiosyncratic productivity shocks.
2Barlevy (2002) presents a model with worker and firm heterogeneity and aggregate shocks. How-
ever workers (firms) are identical in terms of potential outcomes and the heterogeneity is effectively
match specific. Additionally, the full stochastic model is not tractable and is solved by replacing the
dynamic bargaining with a fixed piece rate wage.
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of a tractable model of equilibrium search with two sided ex-ante heterogeneity and
aggregate shocks.
Our model adds many important innovations to the prototype model of Robin
(2011). Both workers and firms are ex-ante heterogeneous, which allows us to ana-
lyze the cyclical patterns of sorting (or mismatch) between workers and firms. We
also have an explicit vacancy creation decision which means the contact rate be-
tween workers and firms changes endogenously with the aggregate state, as does the
distribution of types of vacancies that are posted. Lastly, we allow for production
technologies in which workers may not agree on the ranking of firms; that the best
job for worker A may not be the best job for worker B is a natural consequence of
two sided heterogeneity. Identification and estimation is also an important source of
differences. Robin (2011) identified the distribution of worker types from unemploy-
ment volatility since in that model identical firms have a threshold worker type that
varies with the aggregate state; all workers below this threshold are unemployable. We
identify worker heterogeneity from unemployment duration dependence (some worker
types will be in greater demand than others due to firm heterogeneity). We identify
firm heterogeneity from cross-sectional dispersion of firms’ value added. Moreover, we
identify the vacancy cost function from time-series variation in the covariance between
vacancies and output, ant the cross-sectional distributions of firm productivities.
In the quantitative section of the paper we illustrate the mechanisms of the model
fitted to the facts about the relative volatility of output, unemployment, vacancies
and transitions rates (see Shimer, 2005; Hall, 2005; Hagedorn and Manovskii, 2008,
among others). We fit the model to moments on the level and volatility of output,
unemployment, vacancies, transition rates, as well as moments on unemployment du-
ration and the cross-sectional standard deviation of value added per job. The ability
of the model to reproduce the observed dynamics of unemployment at different unem-
ployment durations is very good. We then analyze the interaction between two-sided
heterogeneity and aggregate shocks with respect to the employment/unemployment
stocks and flows. The estimated matching set is definitely cone-shaped and sorting
is strongly positive. Therefore, the business cycle affects two margins of the match
distribution: low-type worker/high-type firm, and high-type worker/low-type firms.
We find that when the economy recovers from a recession, employment expands as
the result of improving employment opportunities for the low-type workers and ex-
panded hiring by low-type firms. Moreover, when the economy enters a recession,
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low-type workers are fired, particularly those matched with high-type firms. At the
same time, low-type firms hire less and medium/high-type firms hire relatively more
medium/high-type unemployed workers.3
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we present the model
and our main theoretical result. In Section 3 we estimate the model to illustrate the
quantitative ability to produce reasonable looking business cycle dynamics. We study
the cyclical behavior of mismatch between worker- and firm-types in Section 4. We
conclude in Section 5.
2 The Model
2.1 Heterogeneous Agents and Aggregate Shocks
The economy is populated by a continuum of infinitely-lived workers indexed by abil-
ity x, and a continuum of firms indexed by technology y. The total measures of
workers and firms are fixed and normalized to one. The distribution of x across work-
ers is denoted `(x) and is exogenous. The distribution of y across firms is uniform. So
y is just a way of ranking firms. The distribution of workers per job type is endoge-
nous, and determined by firms’ recruiting decisions and workers’ mobility decisions.
The cost of posting v job opportunities c(v) is exogenous. The aggregate state of
the economy is indexed by zt. At the beginning of each period the aggregate state
changes from z to z′ according to the Markov transition probability pi(z, z′).
2.2 The Meeting Technology
At the beginning of period t, a measure ut(x) of unemployed workers of type x and a
measure ht(x, y) of workers of type x employed at firms of type y are inherited from
period t− 1, with
ut(x) +
∫
ht(x, y) dy = `(x).
Then, the aggregate state changes from zt−1 to zt. For simplicity, we assume that
separations and meetings occur sequentially after the realization of the aggregate pro-
ductivity shock: separations first, then the unemployed and the surviving employees
3See related work by Barlevy (2002); Sahin, Song, Topa, and Violante (2014) among others.
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get a chance to draw a new offer. Throughout we assume that match formation and
separation is efficient.
Let ut+(x) denote the stock of unemployed workers of type x immediately after
the realization of zt (at time t+) and the ensuing job destructions, and let ht+(x, y)
be the stock of matches of type (x, y) that survive the destruction shocks. Together
they produce effective search effort
Lt =
∫
ut+(x) dx+ s
∫∫
ht+(x, y) dx dy,
where the search effort of unemployed workers has been normalized to one and s is thus
the relative search effort of employed workers. Let vt(y) denote the measure of type-y
job opportunities chosen by firm y (see Section 2.5 for details). Let Vt =
∫
vt(y) dy
denote the aggregate number of job opportunities. The total measure of meetings
at time t is given by Mt = M(Lt, Vt). Define λt = Mt/Lt as the probability an
unemployed searcher contacts a vacancy, and sλt is the probability an employed
searcher contacts a vacancy in period t. Let qt = Mt/Vt be the probability per unit
of recruiting effort vt(y) that a firm contacts any searching worker.
2.3 The Value of Unemployment
Let Bt(x) be the value of unemployment to a type-x worker at t. Consider a worker
of type x who is unemployed for the whole period t. During that period she earns
b(x, zt), which depends on her own type and the current aggregate productivity of the
economy. She anticipates that at the beginning of period t+1, after revelation of the
new aggregate state, she will meet a vacancy of type y with probability λt+1 vt+1(y)Vt+1 .
Let W0,t(x, y) be the value to a type-x worker who is hired from unemployment by a
firm of type y. We assume that unemployed workers have zero bargaining power and
are offered their reservation value, W0,t(x, y) = Bt(x). The value to this unemployed
worker is then
Bt(x) = b(x, zt) +
1
1 + r
Et
[
(1− λt+1)Bt+1 (x) + λt+1
∫
W0,t+1(x, y)
vt+1(y)
Vt+1
dy
]
= b(x, zt) +
1
1 + r
EtBt+1(x), (1)
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where r is the discount rate and Et is the expectation operator with respect to future
aggregate states given the information set at time t. Bt(x) is independent of any
worker-specific history as long as home production b(x, z) is such.
2.4 The Value and Surplus of a Match
Firms have access to a production technology, defined at the match level, that com-
bines the skills of a worker and the technology of a firm with aggregate productivity
to create value added p(x, y, z). We will allow for the possibility that positive value
added may require a threshold level of inputs. For example, a given production func-
tion may require workers of sufficient skill before value added is positive. We allow
for complementarities between worker and firm types: pxy 6= 0. However, since the
production technology is defined at the level of the match, there is no complementar-
ity across workers within a firm. Any correlations in output between workers at the
same firms are attributed to the common firm component.
Let Pt(x, y) denote the present value of a match (x, y) given the aggregate state
of the economy at time t. A match (x, y) produces p(x, y, zt) in period t, and the
continuation value depends on whether the match is destroyed at the beginning of
period t+ 1 or not.
Assuming zero fixed investment in job creation, any vacancy generated by job
destruction is lost and has zero continuation value. There is no severance payment or
experience rating. Hence, after revelation of the new aggregate shock zt+1, the worker
and the firm are better off separated than staying together if and only if Pt+1(x, y) <
Bt+1(x). In addition, we allow for a source of idiosyncratic job destruction shocks δ.
The match is therefore destroyed with probability
1 {Pt+1(x, y) < Bt+1(x)}+ δ × 1 {Pt+1(x, y) ≥ Bt+1(x)} ,
and if the job is destroyed the continuation value of the match is the value of unem-
ployment Bt+1(x).
The current match continues in period t+1 with probability (1−δ)1{Pt+1(x, y) ≥
Bt+1(x)}. Then the worker draws an alternative offer from a firm of type y′ with
probability sλt+1 vt+1(y
′)
Vt+1
. Let W1,t(x, y, y′) be the value offered at time t by a firm of
type y to a worker of type x who has an alternative employment opportunity of type
y′. We adopt the sequential auction framework of Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002).
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The incumbent employer can make new wage offers to their existing workers in an
attempt to retain those with outside offers. Incumbent and poaching firms engage in
Bertrand competition which grants the worker a value equal to the second highest
bid. Specifically, either Pt+1(x, y′) > Pt+1(x, y) and the worker moves to firm y′ and
receives the incumbent employer’s reservation value W1,t+1(x, y′, y) = Pt+1(x, y) as
continuation value; or Pt+1(x, y′) ≤ Pt+1(x, y) and the worker stays with her current
employer with continuation value W1,t+1(x, y, y′) = Pt+1(x, y′).4 Hence, Bertrand
competition makes the continuation value of the match independent of whether the
employee is poached or not:
Pt(x, y) = p(x, y, zt) +
1
1 + r
Et
[
(1− (1− δ)1 {Pt+1(x, y) ≥ Bt+1(x)})Bt+1(x)
+(1− δ)1 {Pt+1(x, y) ≥ Bt+1(x)}
(
(1− sλt+1)Pt+1(x, y)
+sλt+1
∫
max {Pt+1(x, y),W1,t+1(x, y′, y)} vt+1(y
′)
Vt+1
dy′
)]
= p(x, y, zt) +
1
1 + r
Et
[
(1− (1− δ)1 {Pt+1(x, y) ≥ Bt+1(x)})Bt+1(x)
+(1− δ)1 {Pt+1(x, y) ≥ Bt+1(x)}Pt+1(x, y)
]
.
Finally, defining match surplus as St(x, y) = Pt(x, y) − Bt(x), and making use of
equation (1), the preceding equation simplifies to
St(x, y) = p(x, y, zt)− b(x, zt) + 1− δ
1 + r
Etmax{St+1(x, y), 0}.
We are now in a position to state our main result.
Proposition 1. The surplus from an (x, y) match at time t depends on time only
through the current aggregate productivity shock z and does not depend on the dis-
tributions of vacancies, unemployed workers, or worker-firm matches. Specifically,
St(x, y) ≡ S(x, y, z) such that
S(x, y, z) = s(x, y, z) +
1− δ
1 + r
∫
S(x, y, z′)+ pi(z, z′) dz′, (2)
4In the latter case, the aggregate shock may still force the employer and employee to renegotiate
if Pt+1 ≥ Bt+1 but the existing contract would imply either Wt+1 < Bt+1 or Wt+1 > Pt+1, as in
Hall (2005) and Postel-Vinay and Turon (2010).
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where s(x, y, z) = p(x, y, z)− b(x, z) and we denote x+ = max{x, 0}.
Outside offers do not change the size of the match surplus, only how it is shared
between the worker and the firm. When a firm counters an outside offer to retain the
worker this is done by transferring more of the match surplus to the worker, but has
no impact on the total surplus in the match. Similarly, when a worker is poached by
another firm, Bertrand competition ensures that the value to the worker of moving
to the new match is exactly the total surplus at the previous match. The previous
firm is then left with zero since vacancies do not have a continuation value.
We can now explicityly express the stocks ut+(x) and ht+(x, y) as
ut+(x) = ut(x) +
∫
[1{St(x, y) < 0}+ δ1{St(x, y) ≥ 0}]ht(x, y) dy (3)
and
ht+(x, y) = (1− δ)1{St(x, y) ≥ 0}ht(x, y). (4)
2.5 Vacancy Creation
Each period firms can buy the advertising of v job opportunities from job placement
agencies at a price c(v) ≥ 0 that is assumed independent of the firm’s type, increasing
and convex. In equilibrium, the number of advertised job opportunities is determined
by equating the marginal cost to the expected value of a job opening,
c′ [vt(y)] = qtJt(y), (5)
where Jt(y) denotes the expected value of a contact by a vacancy of type y, and qt is
the probability, per unit of recruiting effort, that a firm contacts a searching worker.
The assumption that c(·) is increasing and convex guarantees a non-degenerate dis-
tribution of vacancies vt(y).
Any job opportunity that does not deliver a contact with a worker in the period
is lost and generates no continuation value. Any contact that does not end up in an
employment contract is lost and has zero value.5
5A more sophisticated job creation process could be envisioned, in which fixed initial investments
would give value to job creation above and beyond the service provided by placement agencies.
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The expected value of a contact is calculated as
Jt(y) =
∫
ut+(x)
Lt
S(x, y, z)+ dx
+
∫∫
sht+(x, y
′)
Lt
[S(x, y, z)− S(x, y′, z)]+ dx dy′. (6)
The contact is with an unemployed worker of type x with probability ut+(x)
Lt
and a
match is formed if the match surplus is positive, in which case it is entirely appro-
priated by the employer. The contact is with a worker of type x that is currently
employed at a firm of type y′ with complementary probability sht+(x,y
′)
Lt
. Poaching is
successful if S(x, y, z) > S(x, y′, z) and Bertrand competition grants the poacher a
value S(x, y, z)− S(x, y′, z) = P (x, y, z)− P (x, y′, z).
2.6 Labor Market Flows
The law of motion for unemployment resulting from meetings between unemployed
workers and vacant jobs is therefore
ut+1(x) = ut+(x)
[
1−
∫
λt
vt(y)
Vt
1{St(x, y) ≥ 0} dy
]
, (7)
and for employment
ht+1(x, y) = ht+(x, y)
[
1−
∫
sλt
vt(y
′)
Vt
1{St(x, y′) > St(x, y)} dy′
]
+
∫
ht+(x, y
′)sλt
vt(y)
Vt
1{St(x, y) > St(x, y′)} dy′
+ ut+(x)λt
vt(y)
Vt
1{St(x, y) ≥ 0}, (8)
subtracting those lost to more productive poachers, and adding the (x, y)-jobs created
by poaching from less productive firms and hiring from unemployment.
2.7 Computation of the Stochastic Search Equilibrium
Following directly from the results presented above, we can solve for the stochastic
equilibrium in this environment in two stages.
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1. For given home production and value added technologies b(x, z) and p(x, y, z);
discount rate r; exogenous job destruction rate δ; and stochastic process for the
aggregate state pi(z, z′) the surplus function S(x, y, z) is sufficient to determine
all decisions regarding worker mobility and is defined by the unique solution to
the functional equation (2).
2. For a given distribution of worker ability `(x), vacancy cost function c(v), and
meeting technology M(L, V ); and for any given initial distributions of unem-
ployed workers u0(x) and worker-firm matches h0(x, y), a sequence of aggregate
productivity shocks {zt}Tt=0, implies a unique sequence of distributions of va-
cancies, unemployed workers, and worker-firm matches
{vt(y), ut+1(x), ht+1(x, y)}Tt=0.
This sequence of distributions can be calculated by using the surplus function
S(x, y, z) and iterating on equations (3) to (8) starting from {z0, u0(x), h0(x, y)}.
It is quite remarkable that the dynamics of the distributions of unemployed worker
types and worker-firm type matches can be solved independently of any reference
to wages. This property simplifies equilibrium computation substantially, but we
also think that it makes sense. The match surplus represents the present value of
output in the current match. Its size should not depend on the way it is going to
be shared. Moreover, the assumption that match formation and match destruction
are efficient does not seem very strong. It implies that workers and firms never walk
away from mutually beneficial matches. If it is better for a worker to take a wage
cut than become unemployed then the worker will agree to this. If it is better for
the firm to grant a wage increase than terminate the match then this will occur. The
value of the surplus, not the wage is at the heart of the decision. However, intuition
is rarely straightforwardly confirmed by formal models. Some strong assumptions
are necessary for the surplus not to be a function of the wage or the distributions.
Specifically, transferability of present values requires linear utility, and our specified
offer and renegotiation mechanism is needed in order to remove the current wage and
distributions from the state space.
Before turning to the quantitative application, we note that it is straightforward
to extend our results to accommodate aggregate productivity growth, idiosyncratic
shocks to worker and firm productivity, shocks to the meeting technology and/or the
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cost of vacancy creation, and a birth-death process in which the distribution of skills
for new labor market entrants may differ from previous generations. We briefly sketch
some of these extensions in Appendix A.
3 Heterogeneity and Unemployment Volatility
To illustrate the mechanics of the model, we fit the model to moments of standard US
time series data for the period 1951q1 to 2012q4. We first study the implications for
the business cycle fluctuations of job creation, job destruction, employment transitions
and unemployment. Then, in the following section, we study the implications for the
dynamics of heterogeneous matching between workers and firms.
In estimation we target the means and standard deviations of the unemployment
rate, the number unemployed more than 5, 15, and 27 weeks, unemployment-to-
employment transitions, employment-to-unemployment transitions, job-to-job transi-
tions, the vacancy-to-unemployment ratio, and the cross-sectional standard deviation
of value added per match. We also target the standard deviation of vacancies, the
standard deviation and autocorrelation of value added, the correlation between va-
cancies and unemployment, the correlation between unemployment-to-employment
and job-to-job transitions. Lastly, we target the correlations between aggregate value
added, on one hand, and unemployment, vacancies, unemployment-to-employment
transitions, employment-to-unemployment transitions, and the cross-sectional stan-
dard deviation of value added per per match, on the other hand.6 The values of the
data moments we target in estimation, along with their estimated standard errors
calculated using Newey and West’s heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent
estimator, are listed in Table 1.
These moments are all standard moments used in the literature except for mo-
ments related to unemployment rates by unemployment duration and to cross-sectional
standard deviations of firm Total Factor Productivity (TFP). Unemployment dura-
tion dependence aims at identifying the parts of the model that relate to worker
heterogeneity. The cross-sectional dispersion of firm TFP aims at identifying the
parts of the model that relate to firm heterogeneity.
6The firm level statistics on value-added per worker data (more exactly total factor pro-
ductivity) are taken from Bloom et al., 2014, Table A1, and from these authors’ website
http://www.stanford.edu/~nbloom/RUBC.zip.
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We solve and simulate data from the model at a weekly frequency. We then
aggregate the weekly simulated series exactly as in the data to obtain simulated
series at the quarterly or annual frequency. Details pertaining to the construction of
data moments, the method of simulated moments estimator, construction of standard
errors and specific implementation details are provided in Appendix B.
3.1 Parametrization
We choose the following parametrization of the model. The distribution of workers is
assumed to be Beta with parameters β1 and β2 to be estimated. We approximate the
continuous heterogeneity by a grid of linearly spaced points x1, x2, ..., xNx on [0, 1].
We specify the set of potential job types, y1, y2, ..., yNy on [0, 1]. The distributional
assumption on x has no effect on the value of the surplus function S(x, y, z). Similarly,
we specify a grid of linearly spaced points a1, a2, ..., aNz on [ε, 1 − ε] ⊂ (0, 1), used
to define the aggregate productivity shocks zi. The aggregate productivity shock is
given by zi = F−1(ai), and the transition probability pi(zi, zj) ∝ C(ai, aj), where C
is a copula density, and we normalize
∑
j pi(ai, aj) = 1. Specifically, we set Nx = 21,
Ny = 21, Nz = 51, F is lognormal with parameters zero and σ, and C is a Gaussian
copula density with parameter governing dependence ρ.7 We set the length of a period
in the model to be one week. The discount rate is set to five percent annually.
We approximate value added at the match level by a second order Taylor series
in worker and firm type, assuming proportionality to the aggregate shock z:
p(x, y, z) = z
(
p1 + p2x+ p3y + p4x
2 + p5y
2 + p6xy
)
.
We do not place any restrictions on the polynomial coefficients, which are to be
estimated.8
7This specification is therefore consistent with the AR(1) model:
log zt = ρ log zt−1 + σ
√
1− ρ2εt, εt ∼ N (0, 1).
Using a copula representation allows us to change the specification of the marginal distribution
independently of that of the copula, which controls the dynamics of ranks. It also straightforwardly
delivers a discrete version of the stochastic process.
8Recall that we are modeling value added not total output. We want to allow the possibility that
higher-y firms may operate with more costly non-labor inputs. In this case only workers with skill
above a particular threshold would produce enough to cover the non-labor costs and hence deliver
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Table 1: Data Moments and Model Simulated Moments
Fitted Moments Data Model Fitted Moments Data Model
E[U ] 0.058 0.059 sd[U ] 0.191 0.203
(0.003) (0.018)
E[U5p] 0.035 0.032 sd[U5p] 0.281 0.315
(0.003) (0.027)
E[U15p] 0.018 0.018 sd[U15p] 0.395 0.413
(0.002) (0.038)
E[U27p] 0.010 0.011 sd[U27p] 0.478 0.439
(0.002) (0.045)
E[UE ] 0.421 0.468 sd[UE ] 0.127 0.127
(0.020) (0.011)
E[EU ] 0.025 0.028 sd[EU ] 0.100 0.095
(0.001) (0.011)
E[EE ] 0.025 0.025 sd[EE ] 0.095 0.112
(0.002) (0.005)
E[V/U ] 0.634 0.744 sd[V/U ] 0.381 0.306
(0.001) (0.029)
E[sd labor prod] 0.494 0.505 sd[sd labor prod] 0.039 0.038
(0.009) (0.005)
sd[V ] 0.206 0.105 corr[V,VA] 0.721 0.996
(0.015) (0.149)
sd[VA] 0.033 0.034 corr[UE,VA] 0.878 0.978
(0.003) (0.122)
autocorr[VA] 0.932 0.991 corr[EU ,VA] –0.716 –0.910
(0.132) (0.133)
corr[V, U ] –0.846 –0.975 corr[UE ,EE ] 0.695 0.977
(0.119) (0.108)
corr[U,VA] –0.860 –0.983 corr[sd labor prod,VA] –0.366 –0.365
(0.124) (0.260)
Model Prediction
corr(x, y) 0.479
b(x)
p(x, y∗(x, z), z)
mean 0.700
Firm share of surplus at min 0.561
matching 0.884 max 0.873
Note: Standard errors for the data moments, corrected for serial correlation, are presented
in parenthesis (see Appendix B.3 for details). The data used to construct the moments
is BLS 1951q1-2012q4, with the exception of the moments involving J2J transitions which
uses CPS 1994q1-2011q3, and the moments involving sd labor prod., which use Bloom et al.
(2014)’s 1972-2009 annual Compustat data. y∗(x, z) = arg maxy S(x, y, z) is the best match
for worker x when the economy is in state z.
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We set the flow value of home production to be a fixed fraction of market produc-
tion in the absence of mismatch or aggregate shocks:
b(x) = 0.7× p(x, y∗(x, 1), 1),
where y∗(x, 1) = argmaxy S(x, y, 1) is the firm type that maximizes surplus for a
worker of type x when the aggregate shock is equal to 1. The factor 0.7 is based on
Hall (2005).
For the meeting function we assume a Cobb-Douglas form
Mt =M(Lt, Vt) = min
{
αLωt V
1−ω
t , Lt, Vt
}
,
with α > 0 and ω ∈ [0, 1]. With this meeting function and a recruiting cost function
of the form
c(v) =
c0v
1+c1
1 + c1
,
equilibrium vacancy creation by firm-type is given by the expression
vt(y) =
(
α
θωt
Jt(y)
c0
) 1
c1
,
where aggregating over vt(y) and substituting for qt gives equilibrium market tightness
θt =
(
1
Lt
∫ (
αJt(y)
c0
) 1
c1
dy
) c1
c1+ω
.
3.2 Fit
The empirical and simulated moments are presented in Table 1. Overall the model
fits the moments very well, the exceptions being the volatility of vacancies, which is
only half as volatile in the model as in the data; the autocorrelation of output, which
is too high; and the correlations between output and unemployment, vacancies and
the job finding rate, which are somewhat stronger than in the data.
Table 1 shows that if we draw a long series of aggregate shocks from the estimated
positive profit to the firm. For example, suppose p1 = p2 = p3 = p4 = 0, p5 = −1 and p6 = 1,
then only matches in which x > y will produce positive value added. Alternatively, suppose p1 = 1,
p2 = p3 = 0, p4 = p5 = −1, and p6 = 2, then value added is maximized when x = y and decreases
as x and y differ (x is not well matched to y).
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Markov process (700 years at weekly frequency, discarding the first 100 years) and
simulate labour market outcomes we obtain series that behave like the observed ones
in level, volatility and correlations. We then illustrate the ability of the model to
propagate the single productivity shock to unemployment, vacancies, and transition
rates in Figure 1. Figure 1 displays the one-period-ahead predictions of the measure-
ment series. We first filter out aggregate productivity shocks by exactly fitting the
series of aggregate output. Then, we simulate the change in the other variables using
this series. The fit of the unemployment series is simply spectacular. We slightly
overestimate the employment-state transition rates (UE and EU ) but the dynamics
are very well reproduced. Job to job transitions, on the limited period of observation
that we have, are predicted very well. The volatility of simulated job opportunities is
smaller than in the help wanted series, but vacancy data are notoriously difficult to
gather. One interpretation of the difference is that it reflects the discrepancy between
the the measurement of job openings in the data and the model concept of aggregate
recruiting intensity.
3.3 Parameter Estimates
We now briefly discuss the parameter estimates in Table 2 before turning to the
implications for the mechanics of the model. Overall the parameter estimates are
quite precise, indicating that they are well identified by the data, at least locally.
It is only p4, the loading on x2 in the production function, that has a large and
imprecise coefficient. Aggregate matching efficiency is estimated to be 0.497, with
search on the job 0.027 times as effective as unemployed search.9 The cost of creating a
vacancy is mildly convex with the power term estimated to be 1.08. Jobs exogenously
separate with a weekly probability of 0.013, or a quarterly probability of 0.17. The
unconditional standard deviation of log z is estimated to be 0.071, with Gaussian
copula parameter 0.999. Note that the copula parameter governs the variance of zt
conditional on zt−1 at weekly frequency, making the variance of the change in z very
small (see footnote 7).
9Typical estimates of the relative efficiency of search on versus off the job are in the range of 0.1
to 0.2. Our estimate is lower due to treating workers who transit from employment to unemployment
and then back to employment within the same period as having made a job-to-job transition. One
implication is that a substantial fraction of job-to-job moves in the model would result in a wage
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Figure 1: Data and Model Predicted Time Series
Notes: The dashed lines is the HP-filtered data while the solid line is the model simulated
data. The simulated data is produced by choosing the latent shock process zt and the
scale of output p0 to match the time-series of output and the mean unemployment rate for
1951-2012.
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Table 2: Parameter Estimates
Matching α 0.497 Worker heterogeneity β1 2.148
M = min{α√LV ,L, V } (0.083) Beta(β1, β2) (0.192)
Search intensity s 0.027 β2 12.001
(0.007) (1.951)
Vacancy posting costs c0 0.028 Value added p1 0.003
c[v(y)] = c0
1+c1
v(y)1+c1 (0.014) p(x, y, z) = (0.006)
1 + c1 1.084 z(p1 + p2x+ p3y p2 2.053
(0.040) +p4x2 + p5y2 + p6xy) (0.684)
Exogenous separation δ 0.013 p3 -0.140
(0.001) (0.504)
Productivity shocks σ 0.071 p4 8.035
Gaussian copula (σ,ρ) (0.009) (5.422)
ρ 0.999 p5 –1.907
(0.001) (0.355)
p6 6.596
(0.835)
Note: Standard errors, corrected for serial correlation in the data, are presented in paren-
thesis (see Appendix B.3 for details). Home production is set to 70 percent of maximum
output when z = 1, ie b(x) = 0.7 p(x, y∗(x, 1), 1), y∗(x, 1) = arg maxy S(x, y, 1). The interest
rate r is fixed at 0.05 annually.
The estimated distribution of worker types is presented graphically in Figure 2a,
where we also present the average distribution of worker types in unemployment
(averaged over time). As expected, the skill distribution in unemployment is skewed
toward low skilled workers relative to the population distribution.
Market production, p(x, y, z), is increasing in worker-type conditional on firm-
type y. We can think of worker type and worker productivity as having a one-to-one
mapping. At the same time market production is non-monotonic in firm type y, con-
ditional on worker type. There is positive complementarity between worker skills and
firm technology which is stronger in booms than in recessions: ∂2p(x, y, z)/∂x∂y =
6.6z. In Figure 2b we plot the contour lines of p(x, y) ≡ p(x, y, z)/z. The contour
lines represent increasing output moving from left to right. The output-maximizing
firm-type is (weakly) increasing in worker type. The fact that the output maximiz-
ing firm-type is estimated to be increasing in worker-type, and that it is interior for
all worker types below 0.6 implies that the equilibrium will display positive sorting.
We consider this further, along with the cyclical patterns of worker-firm matches in
cut; an implication that is consistent with empirical evidence (see Jolivet et al., 2006).
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Figure 2: Estimated Distribution of Worker Types and the Production Function
Notes: In Subplot (a) we also show the estimated distribution of worker types among the unemployed
(averaged over all aggregate states). In Subplot (b) the contour lines are increasing from left to right.
Conditional on firm-type y, p(x, y) ≡ p(x, y, z)/z is increasing in worker-type x. However p(x, y) is
non-monotonic in firm-type y for workers with x-type below 0.6.
Section 4.
3.4 Model Implications for Aggregate Shocks, Job Creation
and Job Separation
What does the model imply for how the types of vacancies posted and the composition
of unemployment flows change with the aggregate state of the economy? In Figure
3a we plot the model-predicted expected number of posted vacancies by firm type,
v(y), when the aggregate state is low or high (below the 10th percentile or above the
90th percentile of the simulation). Moving from a boom to a recession, the number
of vacancies posted by firms contracts everywhere, with posting of low-type vacancies
contracting proportionately more than higher-type vacancies.
Our assumption on contracts implies that workers are always offered their reserva-
tion value. The implication is that when a firm hires a worker out of unemployment
it receives the entire match surplus. However, when it hires a worker who is already
employed by another firm it only receives the share of the surplus in excess of what is
necessary to poach the worker. Since there are many more employed than unemployed
workers, firms expect to receive a share below one from newly formed matches. The
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Figure 3: Equilibrium Vacancy Creation and Home- Relative to Market Productivity
Notes: Low (high) refers to periods when the aggregate state in in the bottom (top) decile of the
simulation.
estimated model implies that the initial share of surplus going to the firm is 0.88 on
average (Table 1). Over time, as the match progresses, the worker receives outside
offers which erodes the firms’ share, eventually leaving the worker with the entire
share and the firm with zero when competing with a poaching firm of the same type.
How much value do productive matches create relative to home production? In
Figure 3b we plot the density of b(x)/p(x, y, z) for low and high aggregate productivity
(below the 10th percentile or above the 90th percentile of the simulation). Recall that
we fixed home production for each worker-type to be equal to .7 times their maximum
market production in the absence of productivity shocks. Fluctuations in aggregate
productivity will scale this ratio up and down, and the ratio will be higher for those
workers who are not currently employed in their best match. The mode of the densities
shifts down from .725 to .675 as we move from the low to the high aggregate state.
In the low (high) aggregate state there is another mass at .84 (.77), corresponding to
newly hired workers who have not yet been poached and tend to still be some ways
from their ideal match.
There is always a small mass of workers for whom home production is very close
to market production in their current match, more so in the low than in the high
state. These mismatched workers are the ones at risk of endogenous separation due
to a negative aggregate productivity shock. We discuss further the composition of
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this group in Section 4. What is worth noting here is that for the vast majority
of matches, market production is substantially higher than home production, this
is not a small surplus economy. This is especially true in the high aggregate state
leading firms to respond by posting more vacancies. Fluctuations in the expected
match surplus generates volatility in vacancy posting and hiring while fluctuations in
the mass of mismatched workers generates volatility in job separations. The combi-
nation generates volatility in unemployment. Finally, worker and firm heterogeneity
generates heterogeneity in job finding rates which produces the observed pattern of
unemployment rates by duration.
4 Model Implications for Aggregate Shocks and Sort-
ing (or Mismatch)
In this section, we study the implications of the model for the interaction of hetero-
geneity and aggregate shocks. In particular we look at which types of worker-firm
matches are feasible in different aggregate states; which types of matches are most
at risk of separating due to negative aggregate shocks; and the extent to which the
source of new hires (hired from unemployment or poached from other firms) changes
with the aggregate state.
4.1 Feasible Matches and Sorting
The mechanism for how the model combines two sided heterogeneity and aggregate
shocks to produce the cyclicality summarized by the moments in Table 1 and the
time-series in Figures 1 can be readily understood by examining the shape of the es-
timated surplus function. In Figure 4 we plot the set of feasible matches for the 10th,
50th and 90th percentiles of the distribution of the aggregate shock. The shaded
area bounded by the solid line represents all matches which are feasible when the
aggregate shock is high (at the 90th percentile). The two solid lines inside the shaded
area represent the boundaries of the feasible set of matches when the aggregate shock
is at the 50th and 10th percentiles. If the aggregate state moved from the 90th to
the 10th percentile, all matches outside the new bounds would immediately sepa-
rate. Additionally, the set of jobs that are feasible for unemployed workers shrinks,
since any meetings between workers and firms in this region no longer result in a
20
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Figure 4: Cyclicality of Feasible Matches
Notes: The solid lines mark the boundaries for the set of feasible matches when the aggregate
shock is at the 90th, 50th and 10th percentile (moving from outer to inner lines). The dotted
line plots the optimal firm type for each worker type, y∗(x, 1) = arg maxy S(x, y, 1).
match. Contractions are characterized by both fewer contacts, since firms post fewer
vacancies, and fewer accepted job offers conditional on a contact.
The dotted line represents the ideal firm-type for each worker-type and is calcu-
lated as y∗(x, 1) = argmaxy S(x, y, 1).10 Unemployed workers initially accept any job
in the feasible set (conditional on the aggregate state), and through the process of
on-the-job search gradually move toward the dotted line. As employed workers re-
ceive offers from other firms they will move toward their preferred firm, which will be
further from the boundary of the feasible matching set than the initial job taken out
of unemployment, and hence protected from the effect of aggregate shocks. Low type
workers have fewer employment opportunities than higher type workers, and workers
with short employment tenure are more cyclically-sensitive than workers with long
tenures who have enjoyed a sustained period of continuous employment. Note that
the model requires both worker and firm heterogeneity to produce these implications.
The upper left boundary of the matching set in Figure 4 corresponds to the min-
imum worker type that is acceptable to a particular firm type, conditional on the
aggregate state. The lower boundary similarly corresponds to the lowest firm type
that is acceptable to a worker. Looking at the feasible sets by aggregate state, the
10It happens that y∗(x, z) = arg maxy S(x, y, z) varies little with z and is close to the value of y
that maximizes p(x, y, z), which is indeed independent of z because of the multiplicative specification.
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Figure 5: Joint Distribution of Worker-Firm Matches by Aggregate State
Note: The low and high aggregate shocks are defined as a z-shock at the 10th and the 90th
percentile of the distribution of aggregate shocks. These correspond to the inner inner and
outer bound in Figure 4. Specifically, we plot E[ht(x, y)/
∫∫
ht(x, y) dx dy|zt = zp], where
p indicates the 10th or 90th percentile of the shock distribution. The range of x and y is
restricted to [0, 0.5] as almost all of the mass in in this region.
firms’ reservation worker type fluctuates substantially less than the workers’ reser-
vation firm type. The effect of the business cycle is therefore mostly located in the
lower part of the distribution of firm types. The matches which are most at risk
of endogenous separations due to negative aggregate shocks seem to be the matches
between low-type firms (y below 0.15) and high-type workers (x above 0.2) How this
translates into aggregate volatility, however, depends on how many matches happen
to be at these two margins of the matching set in equilibrium.
4.2 Equilibrium Distribution of Worker-Firm Matches
In Figure 5 we plot the joint distribution of worker-firm matches when the aggregate
shock is at the 10th and 90th percentile of the shock distribution. Specifically, we plot
E[ht(x, y)/
∫∫
ht(x, y) dx dy|zt = zp], where p indicates the 10th or 90th percentile of
the shock distribution.
From this figure it is clear that there is substantial mass along the boundary relat-
ing to the firms’ reservation worker type. In the model, fluctuations in the aggregate
state translate into fluctuations in the reservation worker type that is acceptable to a
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given firm type. Comparing panel (a) and (b) we see that while there is substantial
mass along this boundary in both the low and high aggregate states, the share of
matches near the boundary is substantially lower in the high state. A smaller share
of matches are susceptible to endogenous separations, leading to a counter-cyclical job
loss rate. The reason there are fewer matches at the boundary in the good states is
that workers move more quickly to their preferred matches through on-the-job search.
On-the-job search results in the second “ridge” in the the joint distribution, the center
of which corresponds to the surplus maximizing job for each worker (the dotted line
in Figure 4).
Despite the random meeting of workers and firms, the equilibrium joint distribu-
tion of worker-firm matches tends to feature positive sorting. This results both from
the selection of workers hired out of unemployment (meetings between high-type firms
and low-type workers or between low-type firms and high-type workers never result
in matches) and also from the tendency for workers to reallocate through on-the-job
search. To quantify how much dispersion around the optimal matching line search
frictions and idiosyncratic job destruction shocks are responsible for, we calculate
the correlation between worker and firm type among productive matches holding the
aggregate shock at the mean value. There is a moderate rank correlation of 0.48
(bottom panel of Table 1). Sorting is definitely positive yet far from perfect.
4.3 The Business Cycle Dynamics of Heterogeneous Matches
The comparison of equilibrium distributions of matches for two extreme points in the
cycle does not allow us to precisely quantify the interaction of aggregate shocks and
heterogeneity in terms of the types of matches that are formed and dissolved and the
resulting employment shares. We concisely summarize this interaction in Figure 6.
Consider the non-stochastic stationary distribution of worker firm pairs. This is
the stationary distribution of matches that is implied by zt = 1 forever. Define Q1(X)
and Q3(X) as the first and third quartile of workers in the marginal stationary dis-
tribution, and partition workers into the three groups: [0, Q1(X)), [Q1(X), Q3(X)),
and [Q3(X), 1], which we refer to as low, medium and high worker types. Similarly
partition firms into low, medium and high firm types. In Figure 6, each row corre-
sponds to a different labor market outcome. The three columns correspond to the
low-, medium-, and high-type workers. The three lines in each sub-figure correspond
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Figure 6: Employment Shares, Separation Rates, and Hiring Shares by Aggregate
Shocks
Note: The columns refer to x ∈ [0, Q1(X)), x ∈ [Q1(X), Q3(X)), and x ∈ [Q3(X), 1]
respectively. The solid blue, dashed green and dotted red lines correspond to y ∈ [0, Q1(Y )),
y ∈ [Q1(Y ), Q3(Y )), and y ∈ [Q3(Y ), 1] respectively. For example, the solid blue line in the
top-left panel is equal to E
[∫
x∈[0,Q1(X))
∫
y∈[0,Q1(Y )) ht(x, y, z) dx dy/
∫∫
ht(x, y, z) dx dy|z
]
.
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to the low-type firms (solid blue), medium-type firms (dashed green), and high-type
firms (dotted red).
In the top row of Figure 6 we plot the employment share for all worker and firm
types as a function of the aggregate state z ∈ [0.875, 1.125]. These figures reveal that
the expansion of employment that accompanies a move from lowest to highest aggre-
gate productivity state is largely the result of improving employment opportunities
for the low-type workers and expanded hiring by low-type firms. The employment
share for low-type workers increases monotonically with z (the first panel), as does
the employment share for low-type firms (the solid blue line), with the largest gain
coming from the increased share of low/medium-type worker, low-type firm pairs.
In the second row we plot the job separation rate by type of match. As expected,
separation rates from all types of matches are (weakly) declining with the aggregate
state z. It is the low-type workers who are the most susceptible to job destruction
induced by a contraction in z. This is particularly true for low-type workers matched
with high-type firms. The job destruction rate for these “mis-matched” workers rises
by 20 percent when we move from the highest to lowest aggregate state. For low-type
workers matched to low type firms the job destruction rate only increases by 2 percent.
Among medium-type workers, only those who are matched with high-type firms have
an increased separation rate in low-z states, and this is quite mild. High-type workers
are completely shielded from separations induced by the aggregate shocks.
Finally, in the last two rows we plot the share of hires into match-types separately
for workers hired from unemployment and for workers who made a job-to-job tran-
sition. The share of all workers hired by low-type firms (the solid blue lines in each
panel) is increasing in the aggregate state for all match types, both for hires out of
unemployment and for hires from other firms. The hiring patterns for medium- and
high-type firms are more nuanced. If we consider matches of type medium-medium
(column 2, dashed green line) and high-high (third column, dotted red line), we see
that the share of hires into medium-medium and high-high matches who come from
unemployment is decreasing with z. In contrast, the share of hires into these types of
matches where the worker was previously employed is increasing in z. This reflects
increased sorting from on-the-job reallocation, which speeds up when the aggregate
state is high.
Summing up, when the economy enters a recession low-type workers are fired, par-
ticularly those matched with high-type firms. At the same time, low-type firms hire
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less and medium/high-type firms hire relatively more medium/high-type unemployed
workers.
4.4 The Composition of Unemployment by UnobservedWorker
Types in the Model and by Education in the Data
Our notion of worker-type in the model corresponds to permanent differences in pro-
ductivity across workers. For the purposes of fitting the model in Section 3 we treated
worker-type as unobserved and estimated the distribution `(x). A natural measure of
permanent productivity in the data is education. Indeed we would expect the distri-
bution of worker ability to differ by education level, with likely stochastic dominance
when moving from lower to higher education levels. In Figure 7a we plot the educa-
tion specific unemployment rate from the CPS data as a function of the economy wide
unemployment rate. The unemployment rate for each education level is increasing
with the overall unemployment rate. There is also a clear ordering of unemployment
rates by education, with high school dropouts having the highest rates, high school
graduates having lower rates, and college graduates the lowest rates.
In order to construct a similar figure from our model economy, we group workers
in a way to mimic education groups. Specifically we create three broad groups with
differing skill distributions. The low group is drawn from workers below the 33rd
percentile of `(x); the medium group is drawn from workers below the 66th percentile;
and the high group is drawn from workers above the 66th percentile. In this way
we have created groups of workers in which the distributions of skill stochastically
dominate as we move from low to high. We plot the unemployment rates of our
constructed groups against the overall unemployment rate in our model economy
in Figure 7b. Our group-specific unemployment rates lines up very closely to the
education-specific unemployment rates from the data.
Differences in the level of unemployment across education groups can result from
differences in either the flows into unemployment, the flows out of unemployment, or
both. In Figures 7c and 7e we plot the education specific flows from unemployment-
to-employment (UE ) and employment-to-unemployment (EU ) as a function of the
overall unemployment rate. For all education groups the UE rates fall and EU rates
rise with the overall unemployment rate. Interestingly, while the UE rates do increase
with education, the differences are quite small. The differences across education
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Figure 7: Cyclicality of Unemployment and Transitions
Notes: The three panels on the left plot the unemployment rate, the UE rate and EU rate by
education against the aggregate unemployment rate (source: CPS). The education groups are high
school dropouts (×), high school graduates (◦) and college graduates (+). The three panels on
the right plot the same series for model simulated data using constructed skill groups. The three
groups are drawn from the following overlapping segments the population distribution of x: workers
below the 33rd percentile (♦), workers below the 66th percentile (), and workers above the 33rd
percentile (∇).
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groups in the EU rate are large, with the EU rate strongly decreasing in education.
We plot the corresponding UE and EU rates for our model groups in Figures 7d
and 7f. While our artificial grouping provides a good replication of the education
differences in unemployment rates, it does less well in replicating the transitions. In
particular both the UE and the EU rates for the highest model group are too high; the
model generates too much churning for this group relative to the transitions of college
graduates in the data. Interestingly, we would obtain a very good approximation for
all three groups if we simply multiplied the transition rates of the high group by 0.5,
which would leave the unemployment rate unchanged. Of course then this group no
longer corresponds to a subset of the skill distribution we estimated. We leave it to
future work to estimate a richer version of the model that incorporates more direct
empirical measures of worker heterogeneity, such as measures based on education,
occupation or wages.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we develop an equilibrium on-the-job search model of the labor market
featuring aggregate uncertainty and ex-ante heterogeneity in worker and firm types.
We show that the model has a recursive structure that makes it very tractable. We
fit the model to US time-series from 1951 to 2012 to illustrate the ability of the
model to generate aggregate business cycle dynamics. We then explore the interaction
between heterogeneity and aggregate shocks in the fitted model in terms of the cyclical
properties of the distributions of vacancies, unemployed workers, and worker-firm
matches.
In ongoing work we develop the implications of the model for the business-cycle
fluctuations in the joint distribution of wages over worker-firm matches. Using the
wage distribution implications (which requires more structure on wage setting than
what is assumed in the current paper) will allow us to incorporate richer micro-level
shocks at the worker and firm level, and permits estimation using linked employer-
employee data.
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A Model Extensions
In the body of the paper we have restricted our attention to a single source of aggregate
volatility modeled as an aggregate productivity shock z. The one shock model is sufficient
to demonstrate the theoretical result and generates sufficiently rich aggregate dynamics to
illustrate how the aggregate shock interacts with the heterogeneity. While the one shock
model is useful for the purposes of the current paper, further empirical work based on micro
data will certainly want to incorporate additional stochastic processes and sources of non-
stationarity. We briefly discuss how the model can accommodate these extensions, while
preserving the recursive equilibrium that makes the model tractable.
• Aggregate growth. All allocations and decisions are identical in a model where
market production, home production and the cost of posting vacancies all grow at the
same rate g.
• Idiosyncratic shocks. Shocks to worker skill and/or firm TFP are easily incorpo-
rated by modifying the surplus function
S(x, y, z) = s(x, y, z) +
1− δ
1 + r
Ex′,y′,z′
[
S(x′, y′, z′)|x, y, z] ,
and augmenting the flow equations (7) and (8) appropriately.
• Non-stationarity in the meeting technology and cost of posting vacancies.
One implication of the recursive structure of the equilibrium is that the future is fully
summarized by S(x, y, zt), making the vacancy creation problem effectively static
(there is no fixed point to solve). This implies that the meeting technology and the
cost of posting vacancies can vary with time. For example, we can allow for time
varying aggregate matching efficiency αt, or time varying posting costs c0t.
• Non-stationary distribution of worker skills. For simplicity in Section 2 we
assumed that the distribution of worker skills in the population was given by the
time invariant distribution `(x). This is unlikely to be a good approximation due
to the fact that the workforce has become much more educated over time, as well
as the fact that the flow of new immigrants into a country is likely to have a very
different skill composition than the native population, for example we may expect it
to be over representative of the very low and very high skilled. Such non-stationarity
can easily be accommodated by introducing a birth-death process for workers. At
the beginning of each period all workers die with probability µ and are replaced with
31
newborn unemployed workers nt(x). The flow equations (3) and (4) become
ut+(x) = (1− µ)ut(x) + nt(x)
+
∫
[1{St(x, y) < 0}+ δ1{St(x, y) ≥ 0}] (1− µ)ht(x, y) dy,
ht+(x, y) = (1− δ)(1− µ)1{St(x, y) ≥ 0}ht(x, y),
and the effective discount factor in the surplus function is adjusted to incorporate the
mortality rate. It is possible to accommodate both population growth and an evolving
skill distribution via an evolving flow of newborn workers nt(x).
The model can accommodate both substantial heterogeneity and non-stationary while re-
maining tractable. Of course the data requirements necessary to identify such a flexible
model will be great and require further investigation.
B Data and Estimation Details
B.1 Data Moments
Wherever possible we use publicly available aggregate data. The unemployment data are
from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and cover the period 1951m1 to 2012m12.
We use the BLS series of seasonally adjusted monthly employment and unemployment levels
for all persons aged 16 and over. In addition to the number of unemployed, we also use the
number of unemployed with unemployment durations of more than 5, 15 and 27 weeks.11 We
divide the unemployment levels each month by the sum of unemployment and employment
to obtain rates. This gives us monthly series for Um, U5m, U15m , and U27m corresponding to
the fraction of individuals unemployed and the fraction unemployed more than 5, 15 and 27
weeks, where the m subscript refers to a monthly frequency.
From these series we construct monthly transition rates between unemployment and
employment and between employment and unemployment as follows:
UEm = 1− U5m+1/Um, EUm =
(
Um+1 − U5m+1
)
/Em.
The BLS does not provide a series for job-to-job transitions. We construct this series using
the Current Population Survey (CPS) for the period 1994m1 to 2012m12. This series is
constructed following Moscarini and Thomsson (2007).
11Series LNS12000000, LNS13000000, LNS13008396, LNS13008756, LNS13008516, and
LNS13008636.
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A time series of monthly vacancies can be constructed by combining the BLS monthly
Help Wanted Index (HWI) 1951m1 to 2006m12 and the Job Openings and Labor Turnover
Survey (JOLTS) 2001m1-2012m12.12 To obtain a consistent series we project the HWI series
onto the JOLTS series for the overlapping months in the years. We then obtain a combined
series using predicted HWI based on the JOLTS to put them into the same scale. We rescale
the vacancy series so that the mean vacancy to unemployment rate matches Hagedorn and
Manovskii (2008, Table 1). This normalization fixes the scale for the vacancy posting costs.
Output data is provided on a quarterly frequency. We use the BLS quarterly series
1951q1-2012q4 of seasonally adjusted real value added in the non-farm business sector13.
Since the value added series are only provided at the quarterly frequency, we aggregate all
series up to this frequency by taking the quarterly average for the monthly series. We HP-
filter the log-transformed quarterly series using smoothing parameter 105 (Shimer, 2005).
Finally, we add moments for the mean and standard deviation of productivity dispersion,
as well as the correlation with output growth at an annual frequency from Bloom et al. (2014,
Table A1 and supplementary data).
B.2 Model Simulated Moments
Using the subscript t to denote weekly time-series simulated from the model, we first con-
struct the weekly series of aggregate value added, (un)employment and vacancies,
Ut =
∫
ut(x) dx, Vt =
∫
vt(y) dy,
Et(y) =
∫
ht(x, y) dx, Et =
∫
Et(y) dy,
pt(y) =
∫
p(x, y, zt)ht(x, y) dx, pt =
∫
pt(y) dy.
We calculate the weekly series of the number of unemployed workers with durations of
5, 15, and 27 weeks or more as
U st =
∫
ut−s(x)
s−1∏
j=0
[
1−
∫
λt−s+j
vt−s+j(y)
Vt−s+j
1{S(x, y, zt−s+j) ≥ 0}
]
dy dx,
where U st is the number of unemployed workers at period t who have been unemployed for
s periods (weeks) or more. We then construct monthly transition rates exactly as we did
12Series JTS00000000JOL
13Series PRS85006043.
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from the BLS data,
UEm = 1− U5m+1/Um,
EUm =
(
Um+1 − U5m+1
)
/Em,
where the subscript month corresponds to the same week which would be sampled by the
BLS.14 The monthly job-to-job transition rate is constructed to match the construction from
the CPS and is calculated as the sum of weekly transition rates within a month,
EEm =
∑
t∈m
EEt.
The resulting series are aggregated exactly as the data to obtain the corresponding quarterly
moments. For example, quarterly output is obtained by summing over output from the 13
weeks in the quarter and quarterly unemployment rates are obtained by averaging over the
monthly rates in the quarter.
To calculate the standard deviation of productivity dispersion, we define annual output-
per-worker at jobs of type y as
$a(y) = log
(∑
t∈a
pt(y)/
∑
t∈a
Et(y)
)
,
where a indexes year, and $a =
∫
$a(y) dy. We calculate our annual series of the cross-
sectional standard deviation of value added per worker across firms as
sd labor proda =
(∫
($a(y)−$a)2 dy
)1/2
.
We fit the model to moments of the US data from 1950q1 to 2012q4.15 Given the
specification above, we have 17 parameters to determine: α, ω, s, c0, c1, δ, σ, ρ, β1, β2,
p1, ..., p6, and r. We fix the discount rate to 5 percent annually, and fix ω at 0.5.16 This
leaves 15 parameters which are estimated to best fit the 28 moments.
14The BLS survey is done each month in the week containing the 12th day of the month.
We sample from our simulated data to replicate this strategy. For example, in the first year
of the simulation we sample the monthly data from simulation weeks {2, 7, 11, 15, 19, 24,
28, 33, 37, 42, 46, 50}.
15The productivity moments are based on data from 1971 to 2011 and the job-to-job transitions
moments on data from 1994 to 2011. See the appendix for details on constructing the covariance
matrix for the moments in the presence of missing data.
16Without using direct information on the costs of vacancy creation there is little hope to separately
identify the vacancy cost function from the meeting function.
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To obtain simulated time-series we begin with a distribution of workers across employ-
ment states and jobs implied by the economy in the absence of any aggregate shock. We
then simulate the economy for 700 years at a weekly frequency, discard the first 100 years to
reduce the impact of initial conditions, aggregate to quarterly or annual data and calculate
the simulated moments.17 The GMM objective function is non-smooth and displays many
local minima. We use a variant of simulated annealing and many starting values to address
these issues.
While none of the parameters has a one-to-one relationship to a moment, we can provide
a heuristic description of identification. The main variation can be described as follows:
The mobility parameters α, s and δ are identified by the average rates at which workers
transit between unemployment and employment, between jobs, and from employment to
unemployment. The parameters of the latent productivity shock, σ and ρ, are identified
by the standard deviation and auto-correlation of output (corrected for selection via the
model). The flow cost of creating new vacancies, c0 and c1, governs the response of vacancies
to changes in profitability and is identified by the standard deviation of vacancies and the
correlation of vacancies with output.
The last set of parameters βi and pk govern the distribution of worker types in the
population and value added. The distribution of worker types is identified by the pattern
in the number of workers unemployed 5, 15 and 27 or more weeks (homogeneous workers
would imply this distribution is exponential). The contribution of firm type to value added
can be then identified by the cross-sectional variation in value added per job. Correlations
over time between the various measurement variables finally determine the last remaining
parameters governing complementarities in the production function.
In practice, the standard errors of parameter estimates convey information about local
identification for our sample data. The standard errors reflect not only the sampling vari-
ability of the data moments, but also depend on the partial derivative of each simulated
moment with respect to each estimated parameter.18
B.3 The GMM Estimator
Let m̂ = (m̂1, ..., m̂N ) denote the N × 1 vector of data moments that we want to fit. Let
m(θ) = (m1(θ), ...,mN (θ)), for θ a vector of K parameters, be the corresponding theoretical
17See Appendix B.2 for details.
18Think of the OLS formula for the variance of the estimator: σ2(X>X)−1. Parameters are
imprecisely estimated if the error variance σ2 is large or if the model is weakly identified because of
near-multicolinearity (ie X>X is near-singular). See the appendix for the precise expression of the
asymptotic variance of the estimates in the GMM case of this paper.
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moments. We estimate θ by
θ̂ = arg min
θ
N∑
i=1
ωi
(
m̂i −mi(θ)
m̂i
)2
,
where ωi are fixed weights and we standard by the moments themselves instead of their
standard errors, which are less precisely estimated, particularly when the variables are au-
tocorrelated. Under standard regularity conditions,[
N∑
i=1
ωi
m̂2i
∂mi(θ0)
∂θ
∂mi(θ0)
∂θ>
](
θ̂ − θ0
)
=
N∑
i=1
ωi
m̂2i
(m̂i −mi(θ)) ∂mi(θ0)
∂θ
+ oP (1).
Assuming that, for a large sample size T ,
m̂ ∼ N
(
m(θ0), Σ̂
)
,
with Σ̂ = oP (1/T ), then
θ̂ ∼ N (θ0, Ĵ−1Î Ĵ−1),
for
Ĵ =
N∑
i=1
ωi
m̂2i
∂mi(θ̂)
∂θ
∂mi(θ̂)
∂θ>
= M̂>Ω̂M̂, M̂ =
∂m(θ̂)
∂θ>
, Ω̂ = diag
(
ω1
m̂21
, ...,
ωL
m̂2L
)
,
and
Î = M̂>Ω̂Σ̂Ω̂M̂.
B.4 The Variance-Covariance Matrix of the Vector of Mo-
ments
The vector of moments consists in sample averages, standard deviations and correlations of
some vector yt = (y1t, ..., yLt) of variables. Let
f1i(yt,m) = yit − µi, f2ij(yt,m) = (yit − µi)(yjt − µj)− ρijσiσj ,
where m = [µ;σ; ρ] is the vector of parameters,19 for µ = (µ1, ..., µL) the vector of means,
σ = (σ1, ..., σL) the vector of standard deviations, and ρ = (ρij)i>j the vector of (non trivial)
correlations.
The vector of moments m̂ is obtained as the solution to
Êf1i(yt, m̂) =
1
T
T∑
t=1
f1i(yt, m̂) = 0, Êf2ij(yt, m̂) = 0, ∀i, j.
19x = [x1;x2] denotes the vertical stacking of vectors x1, x2.
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Let f1 = (f11, ..., f1L) and f2 = (f2ij)i≥j . Let also f = [f1; f2].
First, we calculate the Jacobian of the transformation m 7→ Êf(yt,m), that is
D̂ =
∂Êf(yt,m)
∂m>
∣∣∣∣∣
m=m̂
.
We have:
∂Êf1i(yt,m)
∂µk
∣∣∣∣∣
m=m̂
= −1i=k,
where 1i=k = 1 if i = k and 0 otherwise,
∂Êf1i(yt,m)
∂ρk`
∣∣∣∣∣
m=m̂
=
∂Êf2ij(yt,m)
∂µk
∣∣∣∣∣
m=m̂
= 0,
and
∂Êf2ij(yt,m)
∂σk
∣∣∣∣∣
m=m̂
= −ρij [1i=kσj + 1j=kσi], ∂Êf2ij(yt,m)
∂ρk`
∣∣∣∣∣
m=m̂
= −1ij=k`σiσj .
Second, we need to estimate the variance of f(yt,m). Given the autocorrelated nature
of yt, we use the Newey-West estimator:
Ŝ =
q∑
p=−q
q − |p|
q
T−p∑
t=1+p
f(yt, m̂)f(yt−p, m̂)>,
where q is of the order of T−1/3. Start low and increase progressively until Ŝ stabilizes.
Finally, we can estimate the asymptotic variance of m̂ as
Σ̂ =
(
D̂>Ŝ−1D̂
)−1
.
B.5 Implementation Details
In practice, we use a lag order of 8 in the Newey-West covariance estimator. The fixed weights
used in estimation ω, are equal to 100 for E[U ] and sd[V A]; 10 for E[J2J ], E[sd labor prod],
sd[U ], sd[V/U ], sd[sd labor prod], sd[V ], autocorr[V A], corr[sd labor prod, V A]; and 1 for
all other moments. These weights were selected to ensure the model replicated the variability
and persistence of output, the level and variability of the unemployment rate and variability
of vacancy creation; moments that have been of primary interest in the related literature.
The calculation of standard errors outlined above fully accounts for the use of these fixed
weights.
The moments are not necessarily smooth functions of the parameters due to simulation
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noise. To estimate the derivative of each moment with respect to each parameter ∂m(θˆ)/∂θ,
we simulate the model for 101 equally spaced values for each parameter θk ∈ [0.5θˆk, 1.5θˆk]
holding all other parameters at their estimated values, and saving the vector of moments for
each evaluation. We then fit a polynomial of degree 9 for each moment as a function of each
parameter. The derivative of this polynomial evaluated at θˆ is our estimate of ∂m(θˆ)/∂θ.
Finally, missing data for the job-to-job and productivity series means that the cells of
the covariance matrix of the data are calculated using only the maximal available data for
each cell. As a result the covariance matrix Sˆ is not guaranteed to be positive semi-definite
(although it will be asymptotically). To ensure inevitability, we multiply the diagonal of Sˆ
by 1 + λ where λ is chosen as small as possible such that all eigenvalues of Sˆ are positive.
In the current case λ = 0.6003. As a robustness check, we calculate the standard errors of
the moments using only the data available for all series and find only minor differences.
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